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Losak: Environmental Law: The Applicability of the Special Injury Rule t

CASE COMMENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE SPECIAL INJURY RULE TO
THE FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT*
Florida Wildlife Federationv. State Department of Environmental Regulation,
390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980)
Petitioner, Florida Wildlife Federation,' filed suit under the Florida Environmental Protection Act (EPA)2 to enjoin 3 the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER)4 and the Florida Water Management District from
maintaining and operating a spillway which polluted an adjacent canal and
surrounding waters. Although petitioner alleged no special injury to its members, it daimed standing under the EPA's citizen suit provision.5 The circuit
court, finding the EPA's abrogation of the special injury rule6 an unconstitutional invasion into the supreme court's power to adopt rules of practice and
procedure,7 dismissed the action for lack of standing.8 On direct appeal, 9 the
Florida supreme court reversed and HELD, that the EPA was not a procedural
*Editor's Note: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the winter 1981 quarter.
1. 890 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980). The Florida Wildlife Federation is a nonprofit corporation,
and frequent environmental litigant. Id. See note 20 infra.
2. FLA. STAT. §403A12(2)(a) (1979) provides in relevant part: "The department of legal
affairs, any political subdivision or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may
maintain an action for injunctive relief against: (1) Any governmental agency or authority
charged by law with the duty of enforcing laws, rules and, regulations for the protection of
the air, water, and other natural resources of the state to compel such government authority
to enforce such laws . . . (2) Any person, natural or corporate, governmental agency or
authority to enjoin such persons .. .from violating any laws, rules or regulations for the
protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state."
8. The petitioner also sought money damages and attorney fees. 890 So. 2d at 66. FLA.
STAT. §403.412(2)(t) (1980) grants attorney fees to the prevailing party, but makes no provision for pecuniary relief. Id. §403A12(2)(a). See note 2 supra.
4. Although joined as a defendant under FLA. STAT. §403A12(2)(a)(1), the DER was
aligned with the petitioner federation in arguing that the constitutionality of the statute
should be upheld. 890 So. 2d at 66.
5. 390 So. 2d at 65-66. In the instant case appellant utilized the two statutory provisions
in order to bring suit against both the pollutor (Florida Water Management District) and
the authority charged with the duty to enforce pollution control laws (State Department of
Environmental Protection). Id.
6. The special injury rule was originally formulated as a means of forestalling a multiplicity of suits. Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 451, 52 So. 802, 804 (1910).
Special injury has been defined as an injury different in kind, not merely in degree, from that
suffered by the public at large. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. v. Thompson, 84 Fla. 346, 16 So.
282 (1894).
7. FLA. CONST. art. V, §2(a) provides in pertinent part: "The supreme court shall adopt
rules for the practice and procedure in all courts .. " See, e.g., Avila South Condo. Ass'n, Inc.
v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1976) (supreme court found statute at issue to be an
impermissible attempt to define proper parties rather than to set out substantive rights).
8. 890 So. 2d at 66.
9. See FLA. CoNsr. art V, §((1) (l9721 425
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law but, instead, created a new cause of action which conferred upon Florida
citizens the substantive right to enjoin environmental nuisances without a
showing of special injury.10
At common law, environmental protection was accomplished primarily
through the tort of nuisance." The nuisance doctrine first appeared in thirteenth century England as an action to remedy interferences with the use and
enjoyment of land.1 2 From this common origin emerged two distinct legal concepts, the private and public nuisance.13 The former was a civil wrong based
on an interference with private rights, while the latter constituted a criminal
offense.14 Because of the criminal nature of the public nuisance, redress lay
exclusively in the hands of the crown.15 Private citizens lacked standing to
bring public nuisance actions absent a showing of injury different in kind from
that suffered by the public at large.1 6
Judicial adoption of this special injury rule" in the United States s resulted
10. 390 So. 2d at 67. The Court also held that corporations may be treated as citizens
under the EPA. Id. at 68. See, e.g., Orange County Audobon Soc'y Inc. v. Hold, 276 So. 2d
542 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973).
11. Trespass is another common law doctrine utilized by private persons for environmental protection. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (floride intrusion constituted a trespass). The trespass action
lies for an invasion of exclusive possession of land whereas a nuisance involves an intrusion
into the use and enjoyment of the land. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, Introductory Notes §822, at
224-25 (1939).
12. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §86 (4th ed. 1971). "Nuisance" is borrowed from the
french expression meaning harm, annoyance or inconvenience. Id. at 571-72 n.7.
13. This parallel development led to the modern day confusion that necessarily results
when two dissimilar fields of tort liability are given the same name. Id. at 573. See Carroll
v. New York Pie Baking Co., 215 A.D. 240, 213 N.Y.S. 553 (App. Div. 1926). Plaintiff sued a
baker for selling a pie with several cockroaches embedded in its crust. The court held this
disagreeable sight to be a nuisance, although not connected either with land or with any
public right. Id. at 241, 213 N.Y.S. at 554.
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §86.
15. Id. The earliest cases involved purprestures, which are obstructions of public highways. For modern examples of purprestures see, e.g., Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204
Md. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954); Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959).
See also W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §86. The public nuisance action today has expanded to
include such diverse interests as public health, safety, morals, peace, comfort and convenience.
Id. §88.
16. The injury must be different in kind, not merely greater in degree. See, e.g., Jacksonville v. T. & K.W. Ry. v. Thompson, 34 Fla. 346, 16 So. 282 (1894). In Thompson, an ownerresident of land abutting a public highway was denied standing to sue for a highway obstruction which blocked plaintiff's ingress and egress to and from his residence. The court
noted that this obstruction inconvenienced all citizens of the community, and held that the
plaintiff's proximity to the highway increased only the degree of his damages. Id. at 347, 16
So. at 283-84. See also O'Dell v. Walsh, 81 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1955); Rou v. Bravo, 338 So.
2d 45 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1976); Freeman v. McIntosh, 338 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976).
17. According to some authorities, the special injury rule is a misnomer because it invokes connotations of defamation actions where special damage must be pleaded and proved.
In the public nuisance case, only particular damage must be proven. See Smith, Private Action
for Obstruction of Public Right of Passage, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1915). See also Prosser,
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
18. The special injury rule was applied to nuisance actions in the United States as part
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in the frequent dismissal of environmental nuisance suits,1 9 on the grounds
that the litigant- lacked standing to sue. As a result, even where the plaintiff
had actually been injured by a nearby nuisance, relief was unavailable. For
example, in the Florida case of Garnettv. Jacksonville, St. A. & H.R. Ry. Co.,21

the plaintiff parents were denied standing to enjoin construction of a steam
railway that threatened to endanger the health and safety of their children
and to destroy their neighborhood aesthetically. Although conceding that the
railway might in fact be a nuisance,22 the court held that a private citizen
23
could not bring a suit for abatement without a showing of special injury.
Ownership of land adjacent to the nuisance site was found insufficient to con24
stitute such injury.
25
In Florida, this historic strict application of the special injury rule had

only recently been relaxed by the district courts of appeal.2 6 This trend, however, was abruptly halted by the supreme court's decision in United States v.
Save Sand Key. 27 The court held that because the members of the plaintiff
nonprofit corporation failed to demonstrate injuries different from those-suffered by the general public, it lacked standing to enjoin development of the
2
island of Sand Key. 8
Florida decisions illustrate that it is the state, not the individual, that has
traditionally been entrusted with responsibility for the protection of the environment.29 Frequently, however, the appropriate agencies have been either
lax in, or incapable of enjoining such nuisances, particularly where the

of the English common law. It was officially accepted by the Supreme Court in 1838. Mayor
of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91, 99 (1838).
19. See, e.g., Pace v. Niagara Chem. Div., 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1953) (relief denied to worker
whose health was adversely affected by fumes and smoke from neighboring factory). See also
International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944) (frequent users of
public waters lacked standing to enjoin its pollution).
20. Most citizen suits are brought by public interest organizations on behalf of affected
citizens rather than by individuals. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
21. 20 Fla. 889 (1884).
22. Id. at 904.

23. Id. at 901. Accord, O'Dell v. Walsh, 81 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1955); H. Doherty & Co. v.
Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941); Robbins v. White, 52 Fla. 613, 42 So. 841 (1907);
Thomas v. Wade, 48 Fla. 311, 37 So. 743 (1904). But cf. Lulterlon v. Mayor of Cedar Key, 15
Fla. 306 (1875) (any person injured by the city's appropriation of public streets for uses other
than travel has standing to sue).
24. 20 Fla. at 905 (1884).
25. See, e.g., Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, 200 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967)
(private nonprofit corporation denied standing to contest filling operations on Longboat Key).
26. E.g., Town of Surfside v. County Line Land Co., 340 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1977); Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Pollution Control Comm'n., 285 So. 2d
447 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).
27. 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
28. Id. at 12.
29. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974);
Sarasota County Angler's Club, Inc. v. Kirk, 200 So. 2d 178 Fla. 1967) (adopting Sarasota
County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1967)). See also Boyer &
Cooper, Real Property,28 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 1, 20 (1973).
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offending party was a government entity30 This administrative ineffectiveness,
coupled with the citizens' lack of standing under the special injury rule, left
3
the private litigant without a forum for redress of environmental abuses. 1
Prompted in part by this dilemma, the federal government enacted the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). 3 2 NEPA declared as national
policy the promotion of a harmonious relationship between man and his environment 33 Although not specifically providing for citizen suits, NEPA permitted private parties to enforce its provisions as private attorney generals.3 4
More importantly, NEPA established a national standard for the protection
35
and enhancement of environmental quality.

Congress also afforded citizens a greater enforcement role in subsequent
environmental legislationY. The Clean Air3 7 and Federal Water Pollution
Control Acts3 contained citizen suit provisions that empowered private persons

30. Boyer & Cooper, supra note 29, at 20.
31. See, e.g., Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead- Save Our Bay, Inc., 269 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1972). Plaintiffs, a private citizen and a nonprofit corporation, brought suit to enjoin
construction on a public park site alleging that the development would destroy the park as
a wildlife sanctuary. The court dismissed both plaintiffs, holding that neither had suffered
special injury and, therefore, neither had standing. Id. at 698. The court refused to consider
the fact that, by precluding these parties from maintaining an action, they foreclosed the
possibility of any suit that would adequately represent the plaintiffs' interests. Boyer & Cooper,
supra note 29, at 20.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4361 (1976).
33. Id. §4321. The purposes of the bill include promotion of efforts to prevent or eliminate damage to the environment, to stimulate the health and welfare of mankind, to enrich
the ecological system, and to establish a council on environmental quality. Id.
34. See Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
35. Id. 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1976). The laws, regulations and policies of the United States
are to be interpreted and administered to the fullest extent possible in accordance with the
policies of NEPA. Id. See F. G4D, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §8.03 (2d ed. 1978). NEPA also
led to the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency, Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970,
3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970 Compilation), and created the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) 42 U.S.C. §§4341-4347 (1976). Further, the Act requires the filing of environmental impact statements before any federal projects that may adversely affect the environment may
be undertaken. This provision has become the most significant part of NEPA. 42 U.S.C.
§4332 (1976).
36. An alternative, widely advocated but nowhere adopted, is the prospect of conferring
standing on the natural objects of the environment themselves. See C. STONE, SHouLD TREEzS
HAVE STANDING? (1974). This idea is not as novel as it seems; other inanimate objects, such
as municipalities and corporations already have the power to sue in their own right. Id. at
10, 17. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 749-50 (1972) (Douglas J., dissenting).
37. The Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§1857-1858 (1976), provides for a combined
federal-state effort to abate air pollution. The federal government determines the kind and
amount of pollutants that should be controlled, leaving to the states the responsibility for
implementing the federal standards. 42 U.S.C. §7401 (Supp. I 1977).
38. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376
(1976) (FWPCA) mark a change in regulatory philosophy from previous water pollution control legislation. Instead of relying on water quality standards established by states, the
legislation takes a novel "clean waters" approach which strives "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376
(Supp. II 1972).
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to enforce their regulatory requirements.3 9 Similar provisions were included in
the Federal Noise Control Act of 197240 and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976.41 These statutes were enacted in response to growing
concern over the ineffectiveness of state environmental regulation. 42 The
statutes authorized the Environmental Protection Agency' 3 to promulgate federal environmental quality standards. Further, with the exception of the Federal Noise Control Act, the statutes required state implementation of pollution
44
control plans.
Many states followed the federal scheme in enacting their own environmental legislation. 4 5 The first action taken by the Florida legislature was adoption of the 1969 constitutional amendment declaring it the policy of the state
"to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty.' 46 Two years
later, passage of the Florida Environmental Protection Act (EPA) implemented this political mandate. 47 The EPA empowers private citizens to bring
39. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §7604(a) (Supp. III 1979). "[A]ny person may commence a civil action
of his own behalf - (1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency.. .) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
emission standard ... or (B) an order issued ... with respect to such a standard or limitation." Id. For similar provisions see FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §1365 (1976); Noise Control Act, 42
U.S.C. §4911 (1976); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6972 (1976).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§4901-4918 (1976). Although not as comprehensive as the Clean Air Act
or the FWPCA, the Noise Control Act of 1972 represents a major effort to define the federal
role in this arena. The Act authorizes federal regulation of such major areas as: construction,
transportation, electrical equipment, aircraft noise and sonic boom. Id. See generally Note,
The Noise Control Act of 1972 - Congress Acts to Fill the Gap in Environmental Legislation,
58 MINN. L. Rxv. 273 (1973).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987 (1975). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
represents the federal government's first major attempt to control solid wastes and recycling
programs. RCRA regulations include a qualified prohibition on the open dumping of solid
wastes, and a comprehensive program aimed at management of hazardous wastes. Id. See
generally W. RODGEPS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONmENTAL LAW §6.3 (1977).
42. See F. GRAD,supra note 35, §1.02. The long-standing tradition of controlling pollution
at the source has led to unfortunate jurisdictional impediments, particularly in the control
of air and water pollution where the point of emission may be substantially removed from the
polluted area. Id.
43. Id. The Environmental Protection Agency, as established by NEPA, is actually a
reorganization into one agency of environmental regulatory activities previously scattered in
many departments and agencies. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976).
44. Not all pollution control plans required state-implementation. 42 U.S.C. §7401 (Supp.
1978), 33 U.S.C. §1251 (1976). Additionally, even those plans specifically mandating state
implementation may not be monitored closely. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). The Supreme Court allowed Georgia to include in its plan
a sweeping variance procedure authorizing relaxation of standards when compliance became
unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or impractical. Id. at 69-70.
45. E.g., CAL. PUB. Rrs. CODE §§21190-21193 (West Supp. 1980); MD. NAT. R.s. CODE ANN.
§§1-301 to 1-305 (1974); MIcH. CoMP. LAws §§691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT.
§§116B.01-.13 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2a:35a-1 to :35a-14 (West Supp. 1980). See generally
Maloney, More Heat Than Light: Thermal Pollution Versus Heat Energy Utilization, 25 U.
FLA. L. REv. 693, 697 (1973).
46. FLA. CONST., art. 11, §7. See also id. art. VI, §14 (bonds for pollution control and
abatement facilities).
47. FLA. STAT. §403A12 (1979).
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direct actions against either state agencies for failure to enforce, or against
private parties for violation of any environmental "law, rule, or regulation of
Florida."48
The Florida district courts of appeal initially interpreted this provision expansively, in accord with the apparent legislative intent.49 In Save Our Bay
Inc. v. Hillsborough County Commission,50 the Second District Court of Appeal based its decision, in part, 51 on the assumption that the EPA had elim2
inated the necessity of proving special injury in environmental litigation.
Thus, the plaintiff nonprofit corporation was granted standing to contest the
polluting activities of the defendant without a showing of an injury different
53
in kind from that suffered by the public.
Standing, without special injury, however, did not assure that the environmental litigants would be awarded relief. To win an injunction, Brown v.
Florida Chautauqua Association 4 required that the plaintiff demonstrate,
inter alia, irreparable injury.55 Because damages are unavailable under the
57
EPA,56 this restriction significantly limited the citizen suit provision's utility.
Notwithstanding the EPA's history in the lower courts,58 it was unclear
whether the Florida supreme court, traditionally conservative in environmental
matters,5 9 would construe the statute similarly. This uncertainty was intensified
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Pollution Control Comm'n., 285
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973); Orange County Audobon Soc'y. v. Hold, 276 So. 2d 542 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1973).
50. 285 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).
51. The court held that the appellant nonprofit corporation had standing to enjoin
pollution of waters without a showing of special injury. The decision was based not only on
the authority of the EPA, but also on the "well-reasoned" opinion of the same court in Save
Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.., 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973). Id. at 499.
The supreme court granted a writ of certiorari and unfortunately, reversed the decision. 303
So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
52. 285 So. 2d at 449.
53. Id.
54. 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910). Appellants brought suit for the removal of obstructions
from a public highway that bordered their hotel. The court held that, where the unlawful
obstruction not only injures the right of an individual in common with the public, but also
causes peculiar and special injury to him, that individual has a private cause of action for the
redress of his special injury. Id. at 451, 52 So. at 804.
55. Id. The injury to plaintiff's business was characterized as the kind for which an action
at law for damages would provide inadequate redress. Id. at 454-55, 52 So. at 805.
56. See note 2 supra. FLA. STAT. §403.412(2)(a) provides: "a citizen may maintain an action
for injunctive relief .. "
57. See Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. City of Miami, 299 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
The city brought suit to enjoin the landowner from proceeding with fill operations. The
court reversed the lower court's granting of a temporary injunction, finding that the complaint did not set out facts from which irreparable harm could be found. Id. at 154.
58. See, e.g., Save Our Bay v. Hillsborough County Comm'n., 285 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1973).
59. See generally United Stales Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974);
Sarasota County Angler's Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691 (Ist D.C.A.), cert. denied, 200
So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967); Flagler Beach v. Green, 83 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1955); Henry L. Doherty &
Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (Fla. 1941).
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by the superficial resemblance between EPA citizen suits and public nuisance
actions. The crucial distinction between the remedies was recognized by the
Third District Court of Appeal in Town of Surfside v. County Line Land Co.60
In that case, a landowner brought suit to enjoin the emittance of noxious odors
from the town dump. 1 Although the plaintiff lacked standing under the EPA
citizen suit provision 62 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,6s the
court ruled that the availability of the common law remedy remained unaffected." 4 Despite the holding in Town of Surfside, there remained doubt over
whether the supreme court would blur the distinction between the two
remedies and require satisfaction of public nuisance's special injury rule as a
prerequisite to standing in an EPA citizen's suit.
The instant case presented the supreme court with the opportunity to
clarify the EPA's citizen suit standing requirements.65 Before addressing the
standing issue, the court found it necessary to reject appellee's contention
that the statute was an unconstitutional 67 infringement upon the court's powers
to regulate procedure. 68 The EPA citizen suit provision was instead character69
ized as a conferral of a new substantive cause of action.
Having disposed of this issue, the court shifted its attention to whether the
statute abrogated the special injury rule.70 Upon finding it within the legislature's discretion to dispense with the rule,7 1 the court focused on the legislative
intent underlying the creation of a new cause of action for environmental in60. 340 So. 2d 1287 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1977).
61. Plaintiff, an adjacent property owner, sued to enjoin the town from accepting refuse
in its dump from outside corporations, municipalities or entities. Id.
62. See note 2 supra.
63. The EPA lists three conditions precedent to the bringing of a citizens' suit. FLA. STAT.
§403A12(2)(c) (1979). The first provides that the complaining party must file a duly verified
complaint with the governmental agencies authorized to regulate or prohibit the act or conduct complained of, setting out the facts giving rise to the complaint and designating the
manner in which the complainant has been affected. Id. §403.412(2)(a).
64. 340 So. 2d at 1289. See also Wetzel v. A. Duda & Sons, 306 So. 2d 533 (4th D.C.A.),
cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1975). Appellants, riparian property owners, sued to abate
alleged pollution caused by appellee's discharge of noxious chemicals into Lake Apopka. The
court held that appellant's failure to lodge a timely complaint did not preclude an action
based on the common law right to abate nuisances and continuing trespasses. Id. at 533-34.
65. FLA. STAT. §403A12(2)(a) (1979).
66. Appellee argued that the EPA sought to grant procedural rights of standing to persons
who would not otherwise be able to maintain the action. Brief for Appellee at 6, 390 So. 2d
64 (Fla. 1980). The instant court, however, held the EPA to be a definition and regulation of
rights and, therefore, substantive in nature. 390 So. 2d at 66. Cf. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d
236, 238 (Fla. 1969) (supreme court rule regarding waiver of jury trial is a procedural matter).
67. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(a) (1972).
68. 390 So. 2d at 67. See, e.g., Avila South Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d
599 (Fla. 1977). The court found the statute defective because it sought to define proper
parties rather than set out substantive rights. Accordingly, it was held an impermissible invasion into the court's powers. Id. at 608. See text accompanying note 85, infra.
69. 390 So. 2d at 66. By the enactment of the EPA, Florida citizens have been given
standing to protect their rights to a clean environment, a right not previously afforded them
directly. Id.
70. Id. at 67.
71. Id.
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juries.72 The EPA, the court noted, implemented the 1969 Florida constitu-

tional amendment which proclaims as state policy the conservation and protection of natural resources. 73 Presuming congressional knowledge of public
nuisance and policy, the court held that the special injury rule was not to be
4
read into the EPA's citizen suit provision.7
Nonetheless, the court recognized75 that the EPA's procedural requirements76 may act as a barrier to private litigation77 The conditions precedent

to a successful citizen's suit include both notice to the appropriate agency and
an opportunity for the defendant to remedy the violation.78 More importantly,
the plaintiff must delineate the manner in which he or she has been affected,
thus ensuring that injury and redress, the fundamental components of standing, 79 are present.8 0
The court noted that only equitable relief is available under the EPA.1
Because damages are not recoverable, plaintiff must meet the requirements of
Brown 2 and, therefore, introduce evidence of irreparable injury to secure an
injunction 3 Consequently, the court concluded that abrogation of the special
72. Enactment of a statute allowing citizens to bring an action where an action already
existed upon a showing of special injury suggests that the legislature did not intend that the
special injury rule be carried over to suits brought under the EPA. Id. at 67.
73. FIA. CONST. art. II, §7 (1969) provides: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve
and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law
for the abatement of air and waler pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise."
74. 390 So. 2d at 67.
75. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. §403.412(2)(c) (1979).
77. See, e.g., Furnans v. Santa Rosa Island Auth., 315 So. 2d 481 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1975)
(affirmed dismissal for failure to comply with these statutory conditions). See also Town of
Surfside v. County Line Land Co., 340 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
78. FiA. STAT. §403.412(2)(c) (1979).
79. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In legislating this new cause of action,
the only constitutional requirement is that plaintiff must show 'injury in fact.' This standard,
significantly different from the common law special injury standard, is based on the fact that
courts do not decide issues in the abstract. A showing of injury in fact is necessary to assure
that plaintiff has a direct stake in the outcome of the controversy and will litigate all issues
fully and fairly. Id. at 731-35. A mere interest in a problem, such as that demonstrated by
the Sierra Club regarding the commercial exploitation of Mineral King Valley, is not sufficient to bring an action under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Id. at 739. Cf. State Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Alice P., 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1979) (interprets comparable state statute, FLA. STAT. §120.52(10) (Supp. 1979), as
requiring injury in fact)).
80. 390 So. 2d at 67.
81. Id. at 67-68. See FLA. STAT. §403.412(a) (1979).
82. A mere allegation of irreparable injury will not ordinarily warrant injunctive relief.
See note 55 supra.
83. Permanent damages are sometimes granted in place of injunctive relief, particularly
where the activity is suitably located, advantageous to the community, and operated in a
technologically acceptable manner. Granting such damages gives the defendant a de facto
power of eminent domain. W. RODGERS, supra note 40, §2.3. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement,
26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). In Boomer, dirt, smoke and vibration
from a cement plant inflicted damages upon neighboring landowner. The court granted an
injunction which the cement company could vacate upon payment of permanent damages to
compensate plaintiffs for their estimated past, present and future losses. Id. at 225, 257 N.E.2d
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injury rule in EPA suits would not open Florida courts to an unmanageable
14
volume of environmental litigation.
Appellee's reliance on the special injury rule in defending an EPA action
was both creative and perplexing. In characterizing the citizen suit provision
as a rule of procedure, 85 appellee urged that, by abrogating the special injury
rule, the legislature had sought to define the proper parties to a common law
nuisance action. 86 From this, appellee argued persuasively in the lower court
that the EPA was an impermissible invasion into the exclusive rulemaking

powers of the judiciary.87

The instant court's treatment of the special injury rule, therefore, arose in

an unusual context. Rather than address the scope and purpose of the EPA
directly, the court was forced to evaluate the constitutional consequences of the
legislature's action. By rejecting appellee's constitutional argument, the court
unequivocally declared the special injury rule inapplicable to EPA citizen

This latter ruling, however, was reached without a comprehensive examination of its ramifications on environmental litigation.8 9
On the surface, the decision seems merely to differentiate between EPA
suits.88

90
suits and public nuisance actions on the basis of the special injury rule, thus
creating alternative theories of relief in Florida. Closer analysis, however, raises

doubts as to whether the two theories are really distinct.
The EPA casts the environmental litigant in the role of a private attorney

general empowered to enforce those Florida "law[s], rule[s], or regulation[s]"
relating to the environment. 91 This language could reasonably be interpreted

as incorporating the public nuisance doctrine. 92 If such an approach is fol-

at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317. But cf. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178,
494 P.2d 700 (1972) (land developer, whose sales were adversely affected by odors from a
nearby cattle feed lot, was granted an injunction conditioned on plaintiffs payment of the
reasonable costs of closing and moving the nuisance site).
84. 390 So. 2d at 68. The deterrence of a multiplicity of suits leading to judicial inefficiency and ineffectiveness, has been the traditional justification for the special injury rule.
See Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910). This argument was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 8a (1968). The Court, emphasizing
the adversarial nature of the dispute, rather than the injury suffered by the individual,
granted a taxpayer standing to challenge federal spending. Id. at 101. See generally Davis,
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. Rv. 450 (1970).
85. See State v. Garda, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969) (discussion of the distinction between substantive and procedural law in Florida).
86. Appellees argument was that the EPA, instead of conferring new substantive rights
upon Florida citizens, subverted the supreme court's holding in Save Sand Key by granting
standing to private citizens in public nuisance actions without a showing of special injury.
See Brief for Appellee at 8, 890 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980).
87. See note 7 supra.
88. 390 So. 2d at 66.
89. See note 99 infra.
90. 390 So. 2d at 67.
91. FLA.STAT. §403.412(a) (1979). See note 2 supra.
92. See United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D.
Conn. 1980). The Environmental Protection Agency instituted an action on behalf of the
United States pursuant to the Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§7003, see note 41 supra, to enjoin allegedly unlawful groundwater pollution. Defendants
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lowed, not only would the special injury rule no longer be necessary in public
nuisance actions,93 but the need for an applicable statute or regulation upon
which to predicate the citizen suit would be obviated. The courts, using the
EPA's relaxed standing requirements could, in common law tradition, fashion
necessary relief in accord with both the public nuisance doctrine and the environmental policies of the Florida Constitution. This flexibility in the judicial
framework would assure greater access to the courts for private environmental
94
plaintiffs.
Relaxed standing alone, however, does not assure relief. The instant court
stated clearly that mere allegations of irreparable injury without supporting
contended that because the alleged pollution did not meet the interstate effects requirement
of section 7003, the Environmental Protection Agency could not maintain the action. The
court found, however, that section 7003 was primarily a jurisdictional statute providing a
forum for U.S. environmental suits, and held actions under the statute were governed by the
common law of public nuisance. As no allegations of interstate effect are required by the
common law, the Environmental Protection Agency was permitted to procede with the
action. 496 F. Supp. at 1125. For a discussion of the federal common law and its development
in the context of pollution of interstate and navigable waters, see Note, Federal Common Law
Remedies for the Abatement of Water Pollution, 5 FORDHAI URB. L.J. 549 (1977). See also
Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981), which has limited the viability of
the federal common law in environmental actions, leaving the continued significance of the
Solvents Recovery decision as applied to other federal legislation, questionable. RCRA, like
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act construed in Milwaukee, has an imminent hazards
provision which, as the Court in Milwaukee has held, preempts the federal common law of
nuisance. Id. at 1792. The reasoning of the district court in Solvents Recovery is nevertheless appropriate and applicable to the Florida statute which, unlike RCRA, incorporates all
environmental laws, rules, or regulations.
93. The instant court recognized that some exceptions to the special injury rule have
been already carved out by both the judiciary and the legislature. 390 So. 2d at 67. See. e.g.,
Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980); Department of Ad. v. Home, 269 So. 2d 659
(Fla. 1972) (taxpayers need not show special injury when challenging provisions of the General Appropriations Act, but the Brown court reaffirmed the necessity of special injury in
other causes of action); Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972) (zoning). See also
FLA. STAT. §60.05 (1979) (any citizen of the county may sue in the name of the state to enjoin any nuisance); FLA. STAT. §823.05 (1979) (establishes as a nuisance any use of property
which tends to annoy the community or injure its health . . . or become injurious to the
morals or manners of the people). For an interpretation of these statutes, see State ex rel.
Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). Individuals brought suit
to enjoin construction on the undeveloped island of Sailboat Key. The court held that the
complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action despite the citizen relator's failure to demonstrate an injury different in kind from the injury to the public at large. 295 So. 2d at 662.
Defendant's compliance with municipal zoning ordinances did not prohibit the court from
abating the construction as a nuisance. See also FLA. STAT. §120.52(10)(c) (Supp. 1979) (defining parties empowered to petition for judicial review of administrative actions as "any
other person . . . allowed by the agency to intervene or participate in the proceeding as a
party"). For an interpretation of this statute, see City of Key West v. Askew, 324 So. 2d 655
(Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
94. An expansion in available private causes of action may lessen the impact of the
anticipated diminished federal role in environmental protection. See Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1981,
at 23, col. 4. By interpreting public nuisance as a "law, rule, or xegulation" FLA. STAT.
§403A12(2)(a) (1979), the courts would be, in accord with the broad standing provisions of
the EPA, allowing environmental litigants greater access to the courts. This mirrors the
national policies embodied in the federal common law of nuisance. See note 92 supra.
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allegations of fact will not state a cause of action under the EPA. 95 This common law standard" contravenes legislative intent by making a private citizen's
right to enforce Florida's environmEntal laws on behalf of the general public
contingent on the extent of his injury.
A fair reading of the statute would support injunctive relief upon a mere
showing that the defendant had violated an environmental law, rule, or regulation.97 By relying on Brown,98 the court may, in effect, have reintroduced a
concept not unlike that of special injury by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate irreparable injury, the common law standard for injunctive relief. 99
Manifestly, the Brown standard is inapposite to the instant case and may
severely limit the scope of available relief under the EPA. Its application in
the context of a private attorney general statute is regrettable; the statute was
designed, in part, to enable the private litigant to aid in the enforcement of
environmental laws. Were the attorney general to seek the same injunction,
no showing of irreparable injury would be required. 009 Therefore, the court incorrectly employed the private remedy standard to what was essentially a public
lawsuit.

With the recent change in administrations, federal regulation may play a
less signifiicant role in environmental protection, 01 thus placing a greater
burden on the states. The instant decision, by upholding the constitutionality
of the EPA, and interpreting it in a manner consonant with legislative in-

tent,1 02 has removed a major obstruction to the success of citizen suit litigation.
If the statute is further interpreted as encompassing common law public
nuisance, special injury will be de facto eliminated from environmental actions,
thereby giving private litigants greater access to Florida courts. However, unless subsequent decisions hold the common law standard for injunctive relief

inapplicable to EPA citizen suits, special injury may emerge in new form to
deny aggrieved parties relief from environmental nuisances.
BONNIE J. LoSAK
95. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text, supra.
96. See text accompanying note 82, supra.
97. The statute, by its language, empowers the citizen/plaintiff to sue for an injunction
to compel the defendant to comply with the measure at issue. FLA. STAT. §403.412(2)(a) (1979).
See note 2 supra.
98. See note 54 supra.
99. The instant court, after finding for appellants on the standing issue, remanded the
case for determination of the merits. 390 So. 2d at 68. Whether appellants will be able to
meet the Brown standard is unclear from the opinion.
100. State v. Samscot, 297 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th D.CA. 1974); Pompano Horse Club Co. v.
State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (Fla. 1927).
101. See Wall St. J., supra note 93.
102. For an analysis of the intent of the Florida legislature in enacting the EPA, see
Note, The Florida Environmental ProtectionAct of 1971: The Citizens Role in Environmental
Management, 2 FLA. ST. L. Rxv. 736, 752 (1974).
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